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by Jethro K. Lieberman
Almost everything we accept as part of our
ordinary lives on the 200th anniversary of
this nation's independence would have been
wholly mystifying to those who lived in the
Founding Age. That a businessman or tourist could lunch on the Pacific Coast and dine
in the East on the same day, that anyone
could routinely carry on a conversation with
anyone else across the space of a town (or a
continent or an ocean), that watching a live
sporting event in Europe on a screen in the
comfort of an American living room would
be unremarkable-all these commonplace
events and a thousand others would have
earned the foolhardy prognosticator the opprobrium we reserve today for those who
speak earnestly of having conversed with
Venusians or who wish the world to prepare
itself soon for time travel.
Even Benjamin Franklin, that most fruitful genius of the eighteenth century, could
scarcely have guessed where his researches
into the nature of electricity would lead
technologically, much less what social effects the development of electric power
would occasion. The most daring thing anyone could then conceive was steam power,
which was just becoming commercially
practicable.
One hundred years later, during the centennial celebrations, life had changed dramatically, yet it was still nothing like we
know today. The most important application
filed with the U.S. Patent Office in 1876 was
Alexander Graham Bell's for the telephone
(Edison patented the microphone and Otto
perfected the gasoline engine in the same
year). The telephone was surely the most
far-reaching invention since C. Latham
Sholes, the Milwaukee printer, patented his
mechanical "Type-Writer" nine years before
(a device only Mark Twain took seriously at
first, it would not come into general commercial use until the turn of the century).
Today, the mere listing of the inventions

and discoveries that have transformed
American life during the past 100 years
would fill volumes. No significant institution has been left untouched by modern
technology-with the possible exception of
the courts.
That can't be true, you say? Think for a
moment. Think for a moment beyond the
automatic elevator that takes you to the
proper floor, the telephone that sitson the
judge's desk in chambers, the fluorescent
lighting, the central heating and air conditioning, the simulated woodgrain plastic
table tops, the electric typewriter yoked to a
paper tape for speeding up the production of
opinions-all the things that make the courthouse, as a building and an office, recognizable as belonging to the present rather than
the past. In what manner have these innovations influenced the judicial procedures for
determining truth and resolving disputes?
In what manner have these modern appliances assisted in the struggle for justice?
Transport a jurist from the nineteenth
century, bring him up to date in the English
language, the substantive law, and the rules
of procedure, and he could ascend the bench
straightaway. The basic framework of litigation would not surprise him, nor would the
functions performed by court personnel. Indeed, judges from remoter pasts than the
centennial year could function in the modern role as well. Until very recent times, the
technological revolution had largely passed
the courts by. "The practice of law in most
courtrooms today is about as modern as the
practice of surgery in a barber shop," one
group of technology advocates has written.
Now all that is changing. Computers and
videotape, to name the most prominent technological developments, have invaded the
back rooms and trial rooms of courts
throughout the United States. In the short
compass of the present article it will be
possible only to set forth these develop-

ments (and hint at a few others) in broadest
relief. Taking such a tack may prove useful,
however, because all too many articles of
late have failed to go beyond the immediate
applications of the revolutions they preach.

Computers to the rescue?
Deprived of their computers, large-scale enterprises in the United States would collapse. No institution that must keep track of
hundreds of thousands or millions of customers could conceivably continue to operate, at least without dramatically increased
labor costs and a record of mistakes that
would soon become a serious national issue.
That, precisely, is where most courts are
now.
Stories can be multiplied endlessly, so

1. Alexander Graham Bell's patent application for the
telephone was filed in 1876. (Bettmann Archive) 2.
Benjamin Franklin, inventive genius of revolutionary
times. 3. A judge reviews court data on a cathode ray
tube terminal.
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consider just this one. A former assistant in
the Manhattan district attorney's office recalls the case of a man locked up in the
Tombs in the mid-1970's for two years
pending trial because his file was lost. No
one intended to make him wait; it was just
that no one knew he was waiting at all.
Despite its Hellerish overtones, the mistake
is understandable: in a city that makes some
200,000 arrests every year, "slippage" is
inevitable. But it is also intolerable, and it is
here, in the area of clerical tasks that relate to
the maintenance of lists-dockets, calendaring, individual case progress reports, jury
selection-that the by now not-so-new computer technology will be most effectively
harnessed.
There is much to be done. Clerical tasks
are still largely performed manually. The
court clerk's office in many large cities is a
sluggish bureaucracy that might make the
U.S. Army seem efficient. Important details
of pending litigation are laboriously copied
out in longhand into heavy ledgers; bulky
files have to be transported from floor to
floor, and documents (or entire case files)
cannot always be found. Getting help on the
telephone is possible but far from dependable.
The technological revolution in size and
cost could wipe out these difficulties within
the decade in every courtroom in the United
States, legislatures and Congress willing.
For it is now entirely feasible (as is being
demonstrated in selected courts in many
states) to store in computer memories every
transaction in a given case, available for
instant display on a television screen at the
touch of a few buttons (with instant transcription on paper available at the touch of
but one button more). Delay, one of the most
serious impediments to justice, whether
criminal or civil, could be eliminated-at
least that delay caused by the clerical process, the press of business, and the size of
the undertaking. Without computer aid, the
problem can only grow worse.
In 1940, 68,135 cases were filed in the
federal courts. Ten years later the total rose
to 92,342. By 1960 the figure was down a
little, to 89,112. The explosion came during
the 1960's. In 1969, 112,606 cases were filed;
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five years later the total climbed to 143,284.
And though the number of authorized trial
court judgeships more or less kept pace,
many seats remained vacant for political
reasons. In any event, this staggering caseload has been dumped on a clerical staff that
has not kept pace, in terms of either staff or
efficiency. The problem has been at least as
acute in the state courts.
In a computerized system, data would be
instantaneously "filed" in each case. Arrests,
arraignments, indictments, complaints, answers, motions, postponements would all be
noted in the record, and the text of all
pertinent documents likewise would be contained therein. Someday, no doubt-the
technology is available now-the plaintiff's
attorney will enter the complaint directly
into the computer, which will automatically
notify and send copies to defendants. From
his office the lawyer will be able to transact
all business that he currently conducts in
person in the clerk's office. When printouts
of every case reach the administrator's desk,
with flags attached to trouble spots, it will be
impossible to keep a defendant incarcerated
because a file is lost. Additionally, the computer would schedule the calendar, select
jurors from voter lists, and prepare and address summonses and all other notices.
The existence of such extensive and easily
obtainable files and systems may do more
than increase the convenience of the parties
or the clerks, however. It should:
* Force the employment of a higherquality court personnel while reducing their
total numbers. Computers are not toys, and
adapting to computerized systems requires a
high degree of skill and mental alertness.
Rote and drudgery will largely be eliminated, leaving only more skilled tasks. (If qualified people are not found, the system will be
doomed to fail.)
* Bring about a reorganization of staffs
and procedures. Computer simulation,
based on statistics which the computer systems will automatically generate, will enable administrators to determine for the first
time how to deploy personnel most efficiently. Should cases be broken apart and
assigned to different lawyers in the D.A.'s
office, or should one lawyer carry them all

A technician monitors a mock trial in the video
control room at Hastings College of the Law,
University of California.
the way through? What would be the most
efficient use of one or two or x number of
extra attorneys? What types of cases or factors in the cases are not amenable to conventional litigation and ought to be assigned to
arbitration or some other process? These
questions can be answered now at best only
by inspired hunches. Computer simulation
will permit much of the guesswork to be
removed.
* Pressure judges and other court personnel to work harder. Efficiency of court
personnel-including, especially, judgeswill become a matter of statistical record.
Just as the computerization of the private
law firms' time records generates voluminous statistical evidence showing which of
the associates-and partners-are most productive, so the computer will show whose
docket is the oldest, whose is most crowded,
who is most diligent, who wastes time. The
potential impact of this development is huge
and not necessarily beneficial. Many judges
will resent being tethered-or feeling as if
they were tethered-to an implacable disgorger of mile-long folded paper. They will
fear the loss of their autonomy. They will
resist computerization; they will attempt to
sidetrack or minimize its impact; some may
ultimately attempt to deceive or even sabotage it.
We can reject the arguments of those judges who fear the loss of long afternoons for
golf without rejecting one aspect of their
worries. Efficiency does not equal justice.
General efficiency may make for a higher
general standard of justice but result in

a greater injustice in a particular case. If a
judge's worth comes to be measured by a
constantly escalating case-per-hour ratio, no
one wins. And at least one writer warns of
the dangers of blackmail if law enforcement
agencies, because they may operate a computer system for the courts, can learn
through computer-generated statistical data
how well or badly each judge performs.
Moreover, we know precious little about
how our culture will change in general as a
result of individuals' adapting themselves to
computers, and we know nothing at all
about this in the context of the courts. One
problem cannot fail to have escaped the
attention of anyone who has ever dealt with
a store's accounting office that has recently
converted to computerized credit. Catch the
billing department in an error and point it
out: nothing will happen. No, not quite
nothing; the computer will demand payment in a carefully modulated campaign of
rising invective. It can take months to force
the store to correct the record, because the
computer system is not designed to correct
original errors. Any general judicial computerization will require, at a minimum, a
program that can be promptly and easily
corrected. This ought to be the function of a
separate office-the computer ombudsman-perhaps attached to the general administrative office; in no event should the
responsibility for correction be lodged with
a particular attorney or judge handling the
case.
This consideration gives rise to anotherthe loss of privacy. As a general rule, court
records are open to the public. Anyone may
inspect the documents and notations that
pertain to a particular cise, but the catch
is that the curious-whether a member of
the press, a political opponent, or one of the
public at large-must come down to the
courthouse. This "nuisance" is overshadowed by the difficulty of finding anything in
a system that is notable for a lack of crossreferencing. If you know a docket number
(or a name and the date on which the legal
action commenced), you can generally find
what you want. But these are not always
available 'and so, as a practical matter, material in the record does not travel very far.
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A speaker is recorded simultaneously by videotape and court reporter.
The computer, however, changes all that. It
is-or will be-programmed for crossreference (dates, names, crimes, docket
numbers-even social security numbers?).
When such information as arrest and presentencing reports go into a state criminal
history file, the potential for widespread
dissemination of personal matters becomes
apparent. Even if the information is locked
in a "secure" memory, the potential for
abuse by those with access to the password
or by those who learn to tap into computers
will remain a ticklish problem. In any event,
it will focus attention on the question of
precisely what types of information should
be kept within the judicial system, forbidden to the public and to law enforcement
agencies alike.
Toward a two-dimensional trial?
From some quarters, we hear that the most
exciting technological prospect now awaiting the American court is the abolition of
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trial tedium with the ultimate in American
entertainment: television. The same videotape techniques pioneered for Superbowl
instant replay will, it is confidently predicted by a number of enthusiastic writers,
enable the jury to watch an edited version of
the trial on a split screen. Instead of enduring the delays and fatigue of a drawn-out
trial, the jurors will see a smooth, continuous version, available for review as necessary.
This is no fantasy. Dozens of such trials
have already been conducted, and doubtless
many more will follow. The restrained use
of videotape makes sense, and many believe
videotape will soon become a fixture in
American courtrooms.
Regular readers of JUDICATURE are familiar with the literature and the issues, but it
will be useful, at least for the uninitiated, to
summarize videotape's three basic potential
applications.
First is its use in preserving the trial
record. This seems sensible. Most trial records are never transcribed simply because
most cases are not appealed. It should be
cheaper to record on reusable magnetic tape
than to pay the top wages of a court reporter.
This proposition is not entirely free from
doubt; court reporters have heatedly raised a
variety of arguments. They suggest, for example, that when a record does need to be
prepared for appeal, the cost is higher when
it is transcribed from magnetic tape than
from a stenotypist's tape. Perhaps that is so,
but we may assume these to be short-run
difficulties. Direct computer transcription
from sound will eventually become feasible.
Such a development will largely answer the
accurate observation that it is more timeconsuming and less productive for appellate
judges to study the videotape record than the
traditional trial transcript (because the videotape has so much more unavoidable information, much of it irrelevant to the appellate
court, packaged in). The belief that judges
will be able to compare, analyze, and root
out trial error by means of videotape rather
than a written record is a McLuhanacy that
no videotape technology can cure. But these
problems will be surmounted instead by
more sophisticated computer technology,

and these objections will vanish with the
production of a printed transcript.
The second major function of videotape
will be to put into evidence such things as
testimony of witnesses and close-ups of documents by (as it were) remote control. At the
moment the technology is crude-or to put
the point more accurately, the economic
base of the technology is underdeveloped.
The idea is to save a distant or busy witness
the trouble of having to come to court to
testify. The county medical examiner or the
expert witness now residing in Alaska can
appear before the jury on tape. Of course,
counsel will still be obliged to fly out to
Alaska or go to the morgue for direct and
cross-examination, so there may be no net
saving of time, at least in the short run. Over
the long haul, however, when videotelephones become as widespread as the voice
telephone is today, an expert witness in
Hawaii can be routinely questioned by lawyers in Alaska and Texas for a trial in New
York.
In time, all depositions may be so handled, and it may likewise become unnecessary ever to come to court for motions.
Judges, lawyers, and witnesses may conduct
business outside the trial entirely by electronic image from the comfort of their respective offices. Of course, this is video but
not videotape. Such use of technology will
grow, for the most part without objection,
since the saving clause will always have it
that video conferences, depositions, and the
like may be employed where necessary to
save time. Since people rarely object to saving time, no one will object when video
technology in fact does so.
This leads to the third and most controversial use of videotape: the prerecording of the
entire trial. There are several supposed advantages: 1) It will save the jurors' time (the
first full videotaped trial, in the courtroom of
Ohio Judge James L. McCrystal in November 1971, was reduced from five days to a
tape of two hours and forty minutes). 2) It
will eliminate prejudice and errors (improper remarks can be deleted from the jury's
tape so that the judge need no longer admonish jurors to ignore remarks just stricken
from the record). 3) If a jury is hung, another

jury can witness the identical trial. 4) If an
appellate court rules that the trial judge
erroneously edited out testimony, the original tape can be played to a new jury (or the
same one?), without the current necessity of
retrying the case altogether.
But these advantages, attractive at first
blush, are ambiguous. Time saved the jury
must be spent at another's expense. There
will be time consumed in editing. There will
also be an inevitable tendency to play out all
lines of questioning for pre-editing review
by the trial judge-after all, the jury is not
tainted with illicit or irrelevant knowledge if
it can be edited out. And there will quickly
develop a body of learning known as "proper editing": is this elision sufficiently long,
properly disguised? Can it be made without
destroying the context of the discussion?
Even the casual reader of Richard Nixon's
abridged tape transcripts will recognize the
difficulties.
Deeper, psychological problems remain.
These relate to the perceptual reactions of
participants and jurors to tape. Some preliminary studies have suggested that there are
not significant perceptual differences in the
minds of jurors between seeing live and
taped testimony. But these studies are largely simple-minded. One such study, for example, took a relatively simple trial in which
the merits of the two positions and the skills
of the opposing attorneys were more or less
evenly matched. This is hardly a typical
case; moreover, the reactions tested were, of
course, of two different juries, not the same
group of people.
It does not take a great deal of imagination
to see that squinting at a trial on a small,
two-dimensional television screen-even
one specially prepared for simultaneous display of distant, foreground, and close-up
shots-may strike an impression on a juror
profoundly different than seeing a witness
in the flesh. Someday, perhaps, this difficulty can be overcome, at first by using lifesize
screens and eventually through the use of
full-scale, three-dimensional holographic
processes that project the entire filmed scene
into the jury room as though it were live. But
that is a long way off. In the meantime, even
proponents of videotape seem to recognize
90

the psychological difficulties, because they
allow lawyers' summations to be presented
to the jury live. Participant reactions, too,
could be seriously affected, as anyone will
realize who ever froze when asked to talk
into a tape recorder or to leave a message
with a telephone-answering machine.
Still other problems appear. The jury in a
fully videotaped trial would forfeit forever
the right-if it has not already been preempted by experts-to ask questions of witnesses and parties. Moreover, the severe
time compression of the videotrial could
seriously disrupt the deliberative process.
As a research attorney with the American
Bar Foundation has written: "Opportunities
for thinking, rethinking, self-examination,
and interaction with other jurors will be
affected. In addition, the capacity of the jury
to concentrate on the event will vary with
the time and the medium. Concentrating on
several consecutive hours of condensed
legal proceedings on a screen may pose
difficulties. Jurors might lose track, became
distracted, or have a variety of other reactions."
Too much presently remains unknown
(and perhaps unknowable) to follow the
siren call toward total tape. If the judiciary
wishes to avoid baffling perplexities, it must
take videotape in small doses.
More to come
The editors of this issue asked for projections into the third century of American life.
Prediction is always hazardous, but it is
eminently clear that computerization and
videotaping are not the only technologies
with which the courts will come into personal contact during the next several decades. Since we can expect the growth of new
technologies to be exponential (we are now
only at the beginning), the rate of innovation
should be truly dizzying by the tricentennial. We might adopt as a rule of thumb that
whatever we can now imagine will come
true sooner rather than later. It is what we
cannot imagine that takes a little longer. So,
the following points are raised briefly as
examples of what will come well within the
next century and more than likely within the
lifetimes of many of us.
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New ways of determining truth: Advances in voice analysis and in our knowledge of
the chemistry and biology of the brain will
dramatically affect the adversary system and
raise serious constitutional questions. For
more than a century now, science has made
steady and important contributions to the
detection of crime. Fingerprint and laboratory analyses are standard weapons in the
police armory, but these are useful only
when there are in fact fingerprints or chemical traces relevant to the case. Too often a
trial (civil or criminal) turns on the fading,
failing, or crooked conscious memories of
individual participants or witnesses. The lie
detector is not sufficiently reliable for courts
to permit its results into evidence. In any
event, the lie detector simply indicates the
probability of veracity with respect to particular questions; it does not provide any
direct means of ferreting out the truth itself.
New technologies do. Voice analysis, if
perfected, will become a conclusive means
of identification. Far more important will be
advances in brain research. Scientists now
know that stimulation of certain portions of
the brain can cause what are known as
eidetic memories to be recalled-clors,
sounds, odors, textures rush to the surface of
the mind in minute detail. People relive
whole experiences; entire conversations are
dredged up. Will electrical and drug stimulation based on such researches be held to
violate the Fifth Amendment or a person's
right to privacy generally? Or will these
techniques, too, become so irresistible that
no one will any longer need to resort to
cross-examination? Will machines be built
to simulate eidetic memories so that any lie
detector would be fooled? A frightening
prospect? Perhaps, but one with which our
grandchildren may well be faced.
Implications for sentencing: Brain research will also greatly sharpen our ability
to control behavior. Already the law is having to face up to the consequences of
behavior-altering drugs and operations. May
a person who is not "competent" consent to
drug "therapy" or brain operations? May a
guardian consent for such a person? When
the functioning of the brain is better understood, so that we can (or think we can)

predict with some confidence the likely behaviors of specific individuals, and when we
can alter that behavior, there will necessarily
be a revolution in sentencing. A whole new
jurisprudence of punishment, rehabilitation,
and preventive detention will displace the
older learning, sweeping jails as we know
them to history's garbage dump.
Jury collapse: Perhaps this is already
upon us. The Patricia Hearst jury is only the
most vivid example of evidence that is beyond the ability of non-experts (which we all
are outside our specialities) to evaluate in
any truly sensible manner. If half a dozen
psychiatrists with a hundred years of
schooling among them cannot agree, of what
use is their learning to the courts? The
problem can only worsen as claims are
made that computer modeling, supersophisticated detection techniques, and
probability theories can precisely identify
the guilty. When a California court chose to
permit into evidence the statistical frequency of occurrence of a bank-robbing team
consisting of a long-haired blonde woman
and one black man as relevant to the guilt of
a particular couple conforming to that description, it got into all kinds of trouble.
Such trouble can only multiply in the years
ahead.
Judges swamped: Super-sophisticated
technology will also lead to techniques so
subtle that entire trials may be consumed in
testing the validity of operations performed
on prodigious computer memories. In times
to come, complex economic trials-antitrust
and employment discrimination cases, for
example-will depend heavily on computer
modeling and simulations. Even now, the
data in trials such as these are too voluminous to make much sense of manually. How
will jurists, trained in law, cope with the
relevance or validity of the modeling? More
impossible still: when techniques for covertly altering computer memories or programs are perfected, how will anyone be
able to rely onthe technology at hand?
We can only hope that other technologies
will have so altered social conditions in the
coming "post-industrial," "quaternary" age
that these fears become laughable-or
E
moot.

